Open AccessCyber-Attacks Based in Electromagnetic Effects
Author(s) -
Marcelo B. Perotoni,
Roberto Menna Barreto,
Stilante Koch Manfrin
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
journal of information security and cryptography
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2595-5217
DOI - 10.17648/enig.v2i1.45
Subject(s) - tempest , eavesdropping , electromagnetic shielding , computer science , coaxial , exploit , soundness , electromagnetic environment , coaxial cable , process (computing) , computer security , electrical engineering , engineering , telecommunications , cable gland , programming language , operating system
This article covers eavesdropping on computer and auxiliary data communication equipment by means of hardware, namely unintended electromagnetic emanations. The physical basis that underlies the process is covered, alongside with a canonical electromagnetic simulation. Some known cases of these exploits are covered, and real world examples of a leaking coaxial cable and a shielding conductive sheet are measured in the laboratory, with results relate to the data protection and its implications. The measured shielding effectiveness of the sheet proved to comply with usual Tempest requirements.