An Imperfect Firewall: Quebec’s Constitutional Right of Secession as a Device Against Domination
Author(s) -
Lluís Pérez-Lozano
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
politics and governance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.746
H-Index - 18
ISSN - 2183-2463
DOI - 10.17645/pag.v9i4.4569
Subject(s) - secession , political science , democracy , politics , normative , law , political philosophy , law and economics , political economy , sociology
The idea of including a right of secession in democratic constitutions has been discussed by different political and legal theorists; however, little has been said on the matter from the point of view of democratic-republican political philosophy. This article undertakes this effort by means of a normative analysis of Quebec’s constitutional right of secession, as outlined in the Quebec Secession Reference. This analysis shows how the non-unilateral nature of this right minimises the risks for republican freedom (as non-domination) and inclusion in the Quebec secession conflict, while the fact that it is limited to a national constitutional framework dampens this achievement.
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