Open AccessAttitudes and the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination
Author(s) -
André Sant’Anna
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
estudios de filosofía/estudios de filosofia
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2256-358X
pISSN - 0121-3628
DOI - 10.17533/udea.ef.n64a04
Subject(s) - analogy , perception , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , focus (optics) , collective memory , event (particle physics) , cognitive science , connection (principal bundle) , cognitive psychology , cognition , psychology , sociology , social psychology , philosophy , political science , law , mathematics , biochemistry , physics , geometry , chemistry , quantum mechanics , neuroscience , optics
The current dispute between causalists and simulationists in philosophy of memory has led to opposing attempts to characterize the relationship between memory and imagination. In a recent overview of this debate, Perrin and Michaelian (2017) have suggested that the dispute over the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination boils down to the question of whether a causal connection to a past event is necessary for remembering. By developing an argument based on an analogy to perception, I argue that this dispute should instead be viewed as a dispute about the nature of the attitudes involved in remembering and imagining. The focus on attitudes, rather than on causal connections, suggests a new way of conceiving of the relationship between memory and imagination that has been overlooked in recent philosophy of memory.