DETERMINATION OF CRIMINAL CAPACITY FOR CHILD OFFENDERS – INTERFACING THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE CHILD JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT
Author(s) -
Michelle Karels,
Letitia Pienaar
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
obiter
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2709-555X
pISSN - 1682-5853
DOI - 10.17159/obiter.v36i1.11641
Subject(s) - presumption , criminal justice , criminology , mental capacity , criminal procedure , procedural justice , psychology , economic justice , law , political science , interfacing , theory of criminal justice , psychiatry , neuroscience , perception
This submission considers the effect of the doli incapax presumption contained in the Child Justice Act on the procedural reality of South African child-justice process. We further consider Chapter 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act as it pertains to child offenders, both those considered rebuttably incapax, and those to whom the question of age-based capacity do not apply. We conclude that the doli incapax provisions, when interfaced with the tenets of the Criminal Procedure Act, that address mental pathology, are incompatible in so far as they pertain to child justice.
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