Open AccessDiscrete regimes of information reception in non-antagonistic repeated game
Author(s) -
Elena Mokhonko,
Elena Mokhonko
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2074-9872
DOI - 10.17076/mgta_2020_1_8
Subject(s) - set (abstract data type) , mathematical economics , sample (material) , complete information , computer science , sequential game , discrete time and continuous time , repeated game , game theory , mathematics , econometrics , statistics , chemistry , chromatography , programming language
The gain functions depend on the choices of players and time. The set of choices of the second player is changed in time according to one of some variants. The true variant is ascertained during the game. The current information about the set of choices and about partner's choices is received as sample data. An optimal discrete procedure of obtaining information is found that allows preserving the equilibrium.