Open AccessGame-theoretic model of a volunteer computer GRID
Author(s) -
И. А. Чернов,
И. А. Чернов
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2074-9872
DOI - 10.17076/mgta3_7
Subject(s) - reputation , computer science , grid , monotone polygon , replication (statistics) , computer security , function (biology) , profit (economics) , task (project management) , grid computing , game theory , distributed computing , mathematical optimization , computer network , mathematical economics , mathematics , microeconomics , economics , geometry , sociology , biology , social science , statistics , management , evolutionary biology
In the paper we propose a simple game-theoretic model of a Desktop Grid for volunteer computing. Task replication reduces the risk of accepting wrong answers due to sabotage. Saboteur's attack by intruding multiple computing nodes brings him some profit in case a wrong answer is accepted, while the server suffers some penalty in this case. Nodes are assigned some reputation as a monotone function of the number of produced correct (or not exposed) answers. We obtain the optimal mixed strategies and show that the average gain of the players depends only on the server's penalty, nodes' reputation, and the size of the subgrid of nodes with the same reputation. Also we estimate the server's cost per an answer. Numerical examples show that the average cost of the server is not more than that in the case when the number of intruders is known.