Open AccessCOALITION FORMATION IN DYNAMIC MULTICRITERIA GAMES
Author(s) -
An. Rettieva
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2074-9872
DOI - 10.17076/mgta2_4
Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , bargaining problem , best response , mathematical economics , status quo , epsilon equilibrium , mathematical optimization , resource allocation , function (biology) , complete information , computer science , risk dominance , economics , mathematics , computer network , evolutionary biology , market economy , biology
In this paper new approaches to obtain optimal behavior in dynamic multicriteria games are constructed. The multicriteria Nash equilibrium is obtained via the Nash bargaining design (Nash products), and the cooperative equilibrium is determined by the Nash bargaining procedure for the entire planning horizon. Coalition formation process in dynamic multicriteria games is investegated. To construct the characteristic function the Nash bargaining scheme is applied where the multicriteria Nash equilibrium plays the role of the status-quo points. Two variants of characteristic function's determination that take into account information structure of the game are presented (models without information and with informed players). Dynamic multicriteria bioresorce management problem is considered. The players' strategies and the size of the resource are compared under cooperative and noncooperative behavior and for different variants of characteristic function determination.