Open AccessFair and Efficient Allocations with Limited Demands
Author(s) -
Sushirdeep Narayana,
Ian A. Kash
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16706
Subject(s) - fair division , counterexample , mathematical economics , pareto principle , property (philosophy) , nash equilibrium , set (abstract data type) , mechanism design , pareto efficiency , incentive compatibility , economics , contrast (vision) , computer science , incentive , microeconomics , mathematical optimization , mathematics , combinatorics , philosophy , epistemology , artificial intelligence , programming language
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