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Incentivizing Truthfulness Through Audits in Strategic Classification
Author(s) -
Andrew Estornell,
Sanmay Das,
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16674
Subject(s) - scrutiny , audit , lying , agency (philosophy) , incentive , set (abstract data type) , order (exchange) , principal–agent problem , computer science , social welfare , rank (graph theory) , resource (disambiguation) , business , actuarial science , microeconomics , economics , mathematics , political science , medicine , accounting , finance , computer network , corporate governance , philosophy , programming language , epistemology , combinatorics , law , radiology

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