Open AccessPreserving Condorcet Winners under Strategic Manipulation
Author(s) -
Sirin Botan,
Ulle Endriss
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - Uncategorized
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16657
Subject(s) - condorcet method , mathematical economics , social choice theory , tournament , extension (predicate logic) , class (philosophy) , impossibility , approval voting , mathematics , preference , economics , computer science , microeconomics , voting , artificial intelligence , combinatorics , law , politics , political science , programming language
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