Open AccessRobust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games and Extension to Limited Lookahead
Author(s) -
Christian Kroer,
Gabriele Farina,
Tüomas Sandholm
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11482
Subject(s) - stackelberg competition , extension (predicate logic) , adversary , computer science , mathematical economics , mathematical optimization , interval (graph theory) , best response , game theory , node (physics) , nash equilibrium , mathematics , computer security , structural engineering , combinatorics , engineering , programming language
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