Open AccessTruthful and Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Multi-Winner Elections
Author(s) -
Umang Bhaskar,
Varsha Dani,
Abheek Ghosh
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11480
Subject(s) - distortion (music) , maximization , voting , mathematical economics , social choice theory , welfare , upper and lower bounds , social welfare , microeconomics , computer science , economics , mathematics , law , political science , market economy , amplifier , mathematical analysis , bandwidth (computing) , politics , computer network
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