Open AccessMUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism
Author(s) -
Erel Segal-Halevi,
Avinatan Hassidim,
Yonatan Aumann
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - Uncategorized
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11450
Subject(s) - common value auction , vickrey–clarke–groves auction , double auction , mechanism (biology) , valuation (finance) , microeconomics , mechanism design , computer science , unit (ring theory) , strategic dominance , vickrey auction , parametric statistics , mathematical economics , economics , mathematical optimization , auction theory , mathematics , finance , statistics , philosophy , mathematics education , epistemology
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