Open AccessA Bayesian Clearing Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions
Author(s) -
Gianluca Brero,
Sébastien Lahaie
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11445
Subject(s) - combinatorial auction , common value auction , bayesian probability , auction algorithm , clearing , computer science , revenue equivalence , valuation (finance) , mathematical optimization , auction theory , prior probability , bayes' theorem , market clearing , econometrics , economics , microeconomics , mathematics , artificial intelligence , finance
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