Open AccessSequence-Form Algorithm for Computing Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
Author(s) -
Branislav Bošanský,
Jiří Čermák
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9304
Subject(s) - stackelberg competition , computer science , extensive form game , scalability , commit , sequence (biology) , theoretical computer science , combinatorial game theory , game tree , solution concept , best response , representation (politics) , adversary , sequential game , normal form game , mathematical optimization , game theory , nash equilibrium , mathematical economics , mathematics , computer security , database , biology , politics , political science , law , genetics
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom