Open AccessFalse-Name Bidding and Economic Efficiency in Combinatorial Auctions
Author(s) -
Colleen Alkalay-Houlihan,
Adrian Vetta
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8828
Subject(s) - combinatorial auction , bidding , common value auction , vickrey–clarke–groves auction , mechanism design , incentive compatibility , computer science , microeconomics , incentive , strategic dominance , mathematical economics , auction theory , economics
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