Open AccessOn the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice
Author(s) -
Haris Aziz,
Florian Brandl,
Felix Brandt
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8825
Subject(s) - stochastic dominance , outcome (game theory) , common value auction , voting , social choice theory , mathematical economics , dominance (genetics) , matching (statistics) , random assignment , preference , context (archaeology) , computer science , social preferences , microeconomics , economics , mathematics , econometrics , statistics , political science , paleontology , biochemistry , chemistry , politics , biology , law , gene
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