Open AccessApproximate Equilibrium and Incentivizing Social Coordination
Author(s) -
Elliot Anshelevich,
Shreyas Sekar
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - Uncategorized
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8789
Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , coordination game , incentive , equilibrium selection , computer science , order (exchange) , focus (optics) , quality (philosophy) , mathematical economics , payment , best response , correlated equilibrium , selection (genetic algorithm) , mathematical optimization , solution concept , microeconomics , game theory , economics , repeated game , mathematics , artificial intelligence , philosophy , physics , finance , epistemology , world wide web , optics
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