Open AccessDominant-Strategy Auction Design for Agents with Uncertain, Private Values
Author(s) -
David R. M. Thompson,
Kevin LeytonBrown
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7863
Subject(s) - common value auction , set (abstract data type) , class (philosophy) , auction theory , mechanism design , microeconomics , forward auction , vickrey auction , mathematical economics , computer science , economics , mathematical optimization , mathematics , artificial intelligence , programming language
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