Open AccessStability and Incentive Compatibility in a Kernel-Based Combinatorial Auction
Author(s) -
Sébastien Lahaie
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7642
Subject(s) - incentive compatibility , combinatorial auction , computer science , generalized second price auction , auction theory , vickrey–clarke–groves auction , revenue equivalence , auction algorithm , compatibility (geochemistry) , incentive , vickrey auction , mathematical optimization , mathematical economics , microeconomics , mathematics , economics , common value auction , geochemistry , geology
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