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Approximation Algorithms and Mechanism Design for Minimax Approval Voting
Author(s) -
Ioannis Caragiannis,
Dimitris Kalaitzis,
Evangelos Markakis
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2374-3468
pISSN - 2159-5399
DOI - 10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7615
Subject(s) - outcome (game theory) , minimax , voting , algorithm , computer science , approval voting , approximation algorithm , order (exchange) , set (abstract data type) , majority rule , mathematical optimization , mathematics , mathematical economics , condorcet method , artificial intelligence , economics , finance , law , politics , political science , programming language

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