Geopolityczne uwarunkowania rywalizacji o zasoby Arktyki

The aim of the study is to indicate the usefulness of game theory in the context of the effectiveness of geopolitical problem analysis in terms of improving decision-making in relation to Arctic areas. The article presents a series of significant global Arctic problems related to open fisheries, opening Arctic areas for the extraction of natural resources or creating new and more favorable sea routes for transporting goods. Key players in the Arctic area have been identified along with their conflicting claims. It was mentioned that cooperation leads to a reduction in social costs and the stimulation of economic development in the main areas of interest for individual countries. To verify the assumptions, an experiment based on a tragedy of the commons was carried out, in which the participants took the role of fisher-hunters and mining companies. The experiment took the form of a dynamic game, where in each round the participants decided on the volume of catches and resources extracted. The results showed that limiting the freedom of action extended the time of the game, and thus the functioning of the entities and the duration of resources. Leaving plenty of capacity led to agreement between the players and the self-introduction of limits. The experiment showed that the players were aware that only agreement led to gaining benefits in the long term. Thus the creation of an institution supervising disputed areas can lead to conflict mitigation, where entities with different goals and interests must reach agreement, especially when the key challenge is to avoid degradation of the resources and the environment.