
Revising the History of Meta-ethics: the Case of Ayer’s Emotivism
Author(s) -
Santiago A. Vrech
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
anuario filosófico/anuario filosófico
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.124
H-Index - 4
eISSN - 2173-6111
pISSN - 0066-5215
DOI - 10.15581/009.54.3.005
Subject(s) - interpretation (philosophy) , positivism , empiricism , epistemology , philosophy , vocabulary , linguistics
The aim of this paper is double. In the fi rst part I argue against the traditional interpretation of Ayer’s emotivism. According to this interpretation, in Language, Truth and Logic Ayer based emotivism on his “radical empiricist” (positivist) view. I argue that this is not so. Then, in the second part I develop a new interpretation of emotivism according to which Ayer’s analysis of moral vocabulary does not depend on positivism. The purpose of the article is to contribute to the history of metaethics by presenting a correct account of Ayer’s analysis.