Open Access“A Conviction about What is Moral or Lawful” Carl Schmitt on humanitarianism, the humanum, and the possibility of a “universal jus commune”
Author(s) -
Nicholas Hiromura
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
veritas
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1984-6746
pISSN - 0042-3955
DOI - 10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.40279
Subject(s) - conviction , action (physics) , argument (complex analysis) , politics , surprise , philosophy , adversary , law , political action , political philosophy , human rights , epistemology , law and economics , political science , sociology , biochemistry , chemistry , physics , statistics , mathematics , communication , quantum mechanics
Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) spent much of his life arguing against human rights. While this may not come as a surprise, a closer examination of The Concept of the Political reveals that Schmitt’s critique of Liberal humanitarianism is itself rooted in a concept of the humanum as a sphere of substantive moral and political conflict. As an analysis of Schmitt’s concept of the enemy shows, this humanum serves as an argument for the necessity of a juristic distinction between enemy and foe. For, only by distinguishing between the relativized enemy and the absolute foe, Schmitt argues, will we be able to distinguish create a space for particularly political action. Having revealed the framework of mediated moral conflict, in which Schmitt conceives of political action, I then turn to consider Schmitt’s minimalist proposal for a positive definition of a “universal jus commune” and assess its significance for a discussion of human rights.