Open AccessLeon Wasilewski at the Treaty of Riga Negotiations: to the Centenary of the Peace of Riga (1921)
Author(s) -
Iuliia Vialova,
AUTHOR_ID
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
mìžnarodnì zv'âzki ukraïni: naukovì pošuki ì znahìdki
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2415-7198
pISSN - 2411-345X
DOI - 10.15407/mzu2021.30.045
Subject(s) - treaty , political science , peace treaty , geopolitics , politics , democracy , negotiation , state (computer science) , law , diplomacy , economic history , history , algorithm , computer science
The article is dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Riga (1921), discussions about the significance of which do not stop today. What significance did this treaty have for the history of Europe, and especially for its political architecture of the interwar period? What were the consequences of this agreement for Poles, Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians? Estimated of the agreement signed a hundred years ago still differ – some believe that the document then established the borders of Poland almost within the Second Partition of Poland (1793) was the defeat of the then Polish elite, others – that it was an expression of the real state of affairs. This article focuses on the course of Polish-Soviet negotiations during the signing of the treaty, the struggle within the Polish delegation between supports of two state geopolitical concepts (National Democracy “incorporative” and “federal” J. Pilsudski) and establishment of the Eastern border of the Polish state. The well-known Polish diplomat and politician Leon Wasilewski played one of the key roles during these negotiations, and the study of his activities will help to clarify several controversial points during the negotiations. The Treaty of Riga (1921) put an end to the Polish-Bolshevik war, defined the Polish border in the East and the same time cancelled the Petliura-Pilsudski Agreement, which testified to the defeat of the federalist program of J. Pilsudski. Further, the Polish government’s policy towards national minorities later proved to be almost discriminatory, weakening the Polish state from within. For Ukraine and Belarus, this agreement proved to be a national catastrophe, depriving them of the prospects of statehood. This peace can be called a “situational compromise”, which in the short term solved the problem of ending the war, but did not solve any of the geopolitical problems of Poland: neither guaranteed security nor guaranteed the stability of Poland’s Eastern border. The violation of this peace by Soviet Russia was a matter of time, as it happened in 1939