Open AccessOn the Incentives to Increase Input Efficiency under Monopoly Trade Unions
Author(s) -
Tanmay Biswas,
Jolian McHardy
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
review of economic analysis
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.101
H-Index - 1
ISSN - 1973-3909
DOI - 10.15353/rea.v4i1.1533
Subject(s) - cournot competition , economics , monopoly , incentive , efficiency wage , microeconomics , labour economics , wage , duopoly , price elasticity of demand
We examine the effects of and the incentives for increasing input efficiency within a spatially segregated Cournot duopoly with monopoly trade unions whose utility functions depend on both wages and employment. We show that with neoclassical as well as Leontief technology, unions raise wages to appropriate fully the gains from labor-saving technological (or organisational) improvements, leaving the firm with no incentive to invest in increasing the efficiency of workers. However, capital-saving technological improvement may be profitable depending on the elasticity of substitution. Finally, we examine the implication of a fixed minimum wage (or competitive labor market) in one country.