Open AccessThe Relationship between Administrative Corruption and Wages in Egypt’s Governmental Sector: An Experimental Analysis
Author(s) -
Marwa Biltagy,
Mervat Taha
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
review of economic analysis
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.101
H-Index - 1
ISSN - 1973-3909
DOI - 10.15353/rea.v10i4.1476
Subject(s) - conviction , wage , proxy (statistics) , economics , language change , efficiency wage , demographic economics , wage rate , labour economics , law , political science , statistics , art , mathematics , literature
This study investigates the hypothesis that raising wage could reduce administrative corruption. We use experimental methodology applied to 120 participants to test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the higher the wage, the lower the rate of acceptance of bribes (a proxy for corruption), either at zero or positive conviction rates. The second hypothesis is the higher the conviction rate, the lower the rate of acceptance of bribes for both the low-wage and high-wage groups. The main finding of this study is that all obvious differences between wage groups (whether with positive or zero conviction rates) in the acceptance rates of bribes are not significant. This suggests the two hypotheses are not supported.