Open AccessIs Dutch Auction Suitable for Decomposable Tasks in Competitive Crowdsourcing Markets?
Author(s) -
Sankar Kumar Mridha,
Malay Bhattacharyya
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
human computation
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2330-8001
DOI - 10.15346/hc.v4i1.48
Subject(s) - crowdsourcing , task (project management) , computer science , competitive analysis , microeconomics , industrial organization , business , economics , world wide web , mathematics , management , mathematical analysis , upper and lower bounds
Competitive crowdsourcing is a popular strategic model for solving tasks in an efficient economical way. Competitive crowdsourcing platforms generally choose the winners for a single indivisible task following the conventional Dutch auction to minimize the cost. In this paper, we show that when the tasks are decomposable such mechanisms become biased for competitive crowdsourcing markets. As a solution to this, we suggest a variant of the Dutch auction (referred to as time-invariant Dutch auction) for solving decomposable tasks. Overall, some new insights about the mechanism design for competitive crowdsourcing markets are obtained.