Open AccessBuilding biosecurity for synthetic biology
Author(s) -
Trump Benjamin D,
Galaitsi SE,
Appleton Evan,
Bleijs Diederik A,
Florin MarieValentine,
Gollihar Jimmy D,
Hamilton R Alexander,
Kuiken Todd,
Lentzos Filippa,
Mampuys Ruth,
Merad Myriam,
Novossiolova Tatyana,
Oye Kenneth,
Perkins Edward,
GarciaReyero Natàlia,
Rhodes Catherine,
Linkov Igor
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
molecular systems biology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 8.523
H-Index - 148
ISSN - 1744-4292
DOI - 10.15252/msb.20209723
Subject(s) - biosecurity , library science , research center , operations research , political science , history , law , biology , engineering , computer science , ecology
The fast‐paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen‐oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms ( GMO s). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk.