Open AccessRente und subnationale Gewalt. Der Beitrag der politischen Ökonomie
Author(s) -
Hartmut Elsenhans
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
behemoth
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1866-2447
DOI - 10.1524/behe.2009.0002
Subject(s) - economic rent , politics , anomie , constitution , gainful employment , mediation , economics , political science , economic system , political economy , market economy , law , job satisfaction , management , job attitude , job performance
Rents are a basic element of the political economy of underdeveloped economies. They hinder and often block the mechanism of social integration through gainful employment and veto the power of labour, which characterizes capitalist societies and the constitution of citizenship. The impact of rent on political structures is, however, ambiguous. Anomie is only one possible result. Hence the link between raw material exports and non-state violence is also ambiguous. Many societies, which are characterized by rents, have developed quite powerful mechanisms of keeping internal peace, possibly with limited participation. The conditions of differential impacts of rent on social structures and political behaviour call for an analysis of internal interest mediation