
Can the EU’s constitutional framework accommodate democratic politics?
Author(s) -
Nicole Scicluna
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
perspectives on federalism
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.132
H-Index - 3
ISSN - 2036-5438
DOI - 10.1515/pof-2017-0011
Subject(s) - referendum , democracy , constitutionalism , democratic deficit , political science , politics , technocracy , sovereignty , austerity , political economy , autocracy , popular sovereignty , direct democracy , multi level governance , law and economics , law , economics
The robustness of the EU’s constitutional framework – and its ability to accommodate democratic politics – is challenged as never before. The growing disconnect between formally democratic procedures and substantive choice is well illustrated by the Greek crisis. Since its first bailout in May 2010, Greece has held four general elections and a referendum. Yet, the anti-austerity preferences of the Greek electorate have not been effectively translated into policy