Tax evasion: a game countermeasure | Zendy

David Carfì | Zendy; Francesco Musolino | Zendy

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Tax evasion: a game countermeasure

Author(s) -

David Carfì,

Francesco Musolino

Publication year - 2015

Publication title -

doaj (doaj: directory of open access journals)

Language(s) - English

DOI - 10.1478/aapp.931c2

Subject(s) - taxpayer , honesty , tax evasion , evasion (ethics) , measure (data warehouse) , countermeasure , state (computer science) , identification (biology) , game theory , mathematical economics , computer science , economics , microeconomics , public economics , political science , law , macroeconomics , botany , immune system , engineering , algorithm , immunology , database , biology , aerospace engineering

We propose a game-theoretic model analyzing the interaction between the State and any possible relative taxpayer, by using a realistic probability (frequency) approach to the checking evasion strategy. Starting from Allingham and Sandmo's model (1972), we study a possible measure to prevent tax evasion and we also propose a ``honesty-award'' for Taxpayers declaring their entire income by using two Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. This methodology leaves room for further development of the model, leading to a self-identification by tax evaders and honest citizens

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