
Ustawy imitacyjne
Author(s) -
Marek Smolak
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
ruch prawniczy, ekonomiczny i socjologiczny
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2543-9170
pISSN - 0035-9629
DOI - 10.14746/rpeis.2016.78.4.3
Subject(s) - legislator , statute , law , political science , normative , legislation , argumentation theory , politics , conviction , law and economics , psychology , sociology , epistemology , philosophy
This paper seeks to demonstrate that certain enactments in democratic countries where the rule of law is well established are inadmissible in view of their imitative nature. Imitative statutes are normative enactments of parliament which aim at an ostensible solution to a social problem. Ostensibility thus comprehended is accompanied by the absence of will on the part of the legislator to achieve any effect of their activity, as their sole intention is to engender a conviction among the addressed of the norms that such an effect actually takes place. The author discusses four types of reasoning in support of rejecting imitative statutes. These are as follows: first, given non-compliance of legislation with the moral standards of the political community (Ronald Dworkin); second, in view of the imitative goal of the legislator, or absence of a link between a prescribed/prohibited behaviour and the ostensible nature of legislator’s goal (Lon L. Fuller); third, the lack of a rational relationship between a legal prescription and the features of the class of subject/objects to which the prescription applies (Ofer Raban); fourth, the lack of a conventional-moral relationship between the substance of a prescriptive provision and the goal of the legislator (Marek Smolak). The author argues further that argumentation based on the above four reasons should presume that public reason is involved and, consequently, administer the test of the reasonable sceptic as suggested by Ron den Otter.