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From Murphy’s Christian Physicalism to Lowe’s Dualism
Author(s) -
Mostyn W. Jones,
Eric LaRock
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
theologica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.18
H-Index - 2
ISSN - 2593-0265
DOI - 10.14428/thl.v5i2.56273
Subject(s) - physicalism , dualism , qualia , epistemology , philosophy , mind–body problem , consciousness , metaphysics
Nancey Murphy argues that God created us as physical beings without immortal souls. She supports this Christian physicalism by arguing that neuroscience can better explain minds in terms of physical information processing than dualists can in problematic nonphysical terms. We reply that Murphy overestimates neuroscience and underestimates dualism. She doesn’t show how neuroscience can explain the mind’s characteristic qualia, unity, privacy, or causality. We argue that Lowe’s dualism can better explain minds, often with experimental support and in testable ways. Murphy’s physicalism thus serves to highlight the value of Lowe’s dualism today.

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