Open AccessThe dual process model of moral judgement
Author(s) -
Pedro Jesús Pérez Zafrilla
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
pensamiento
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.135
H-Index - 6
eISSN - 2386-5822
pISSN - 0031-4749
DOI - 10.14422/pen.v77.i295.y2021.006
Subject(s) - judgement , deliberation , dual (grammatical number) , dual process theory (moral psychology) , process (computing) , set (abstract data type) , epistemology , moral disengagement , psychology , sociology , philosophy , computer science , political science , law , linguistics , programming language , politics , operating system
In this article I analyse the dual process model of moral judgement. First, I set out Joshua Greene’s and Jonathan Haidt’s propositions, which represent two schools of thought on this theory. Next, I conduct a number of methodological reviews. On the one hand, I argue that the method used is tautological, while on the other, I show that the use of dilemmas is not an adequate tool with which to account for moral deliberation.