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Interesy obiektywne
Author(s) -
Daniel Goldstick
Publication year - 1988
Publication title -
etyka
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2392-1161
pISSN - 0014-2263
DOI - 10.14394/etyka.334
Subject(s) - paternalism , democracy , voting , sociology , political science , law , law and economics , epistemology , philosophy , politics
One of the standard objections against Marxism-Leninism is that by speaking as they do of individuals’ and classes’ objective interests, Leninists are claiming undemocratically to know what is good for people better than those people sometimes do themselves. But all of us have at some time decided that we have been mistaken in desiring something or not desiring something; and so all of us thus recognize in principle the distinction between what we desire and what is objectively in our interests. A definition of people’s “objective interests” is developed in terms of what they would desire if sufficiently informed. A democratic-minded voter unwilling to distinguish between people’s objective interests and their desires could never vote for something as being in the interests of the majority without first ascertaining the votes of the others, with the result that no voting could ever take place if all were so minded. Even “paternalism” is not unconditionally to be avoided.

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