Open AccessCzego należy oczekiwać od utylitaryzmu czynów?
Author(s) -
Robert F. Bales
Publication year - 1973
Publication title -
etyka
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2392-1161
pISSN - 0014-2263
DOI - 10.14394/etyka.267
Subject(s) - utilitarianism , argument (complex analysis) , law and economics , class (philosophy) , law , philosophy , positive economics , political science , epistemology , sociology , economics , biochemistry , chemistry
In recent years, act-utilitarianism has been distinguished from rule-utilitarianism. We may say (roughly) that act-utilitarianism is the thesis that a particular act (as opposed to a type of act or class of acts) is right if and only if its utility – that is contribution towards intrinsically good states of affairs – is no less than that of some alternative act. Rule-utilitarianism is (roughly) the thesis that an act is right if and only if it conforms to a rule somehow grounded in utility. The present paper concerns one type of argument sometimes used as an attempt to show that act-utilitarianism cannot be an adequate ethical theory. Arguments of this type are characterized by an emphasis on practical difficulties involved in, or paradoxes arising out of, the attempt to apply act-utilitarianism theory to concrete moral situations.