
Dwojakie normy
Author(s) -
Tadeusz Czeżowski
Publication year - 1966
Publication title -
etyka
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2392-1161
pISSN - 0014-2263
DOI - 10.14394/etyka.209
Subject(s) - duty , assertion , norm (philosophy) , sentence , obligation , legal norm , law , computer science , psychology , epistemology , political science , philosophy , artificial intelligence , programming language
Moral norms usually have the form of statements of obligation containing the words, ‚should’, ‚ought to’, ‚It is required … ‚, etc.; the form proper to a legal norm is the declarative sentence. In both these forms norms with good sense be preceded by the sing of assertion, ‚It is true that … ‚ and construed as a logically true statement affirming the existence of a duty or state of affairs ordained by a legislative institution. Hence, the contrary opinion denying norms to be statements in the logical sense and attributing to them the function of command or recommendation, is incorrect: for, for a norm to be realized an additional act of decision motivated by a norm of either kind, is required. That decision is expressed by an imperative sentence, addressed to the person due to realize the norm (it can also be the same person that issued the norm, commanding himself to execute it). Occasionally imperative sentences replace a norm – as, eg., in the Decalogue; in such cases, they should be regarded as elliptic expressions with an implicit motivating norm understood.