Open AccessDeviant causal chains and intentional action
Author(s) -
Nyárfádi Krisztián
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
különbség
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2560-158X
pISSN - 1785-7821
DOI - 10.14232/kulonbseg.2016.16.1.197
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , action (physics) , epistemology , causal theory of reference , causal chain , argument map , psychology , philosophy , argumentation theory , physics , quantum mechanics , biochemistry , chemistry
There is a classical argument against the the so called "causal theory of action": the argument from deviant causal chains. This essay tries to show that this argument is not so strong as it first might seem to be, essentialy because the are promising answers to the argument. I reconstruct a strategy (exemplified by Searle and Mele) that can alleviate that concern stems from the deviant examples.