Open AccessMoral responsibility as the condition of moral value
Author(s) -
László Bernáth
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
különbség
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2560-158X
pISSN - 1785-7821
DOI - 10.14232/kulonbseg.2016.16.1.192
Subject(s) - precondition , argument (complex analysis) , action (physics) , independence (probability theory) , epistemology , moral responsibility , value (mathematics) , moral disengagement , moral psychology , value theory , position (finance) , philosophy , sociology , law and economics , mathematics , economics , physics , computer science , biochemistry , chemistry , statistics , finance , quantum mechanics , programming language
Several moral philosophers argue that being morally responsible for an action is not the precondition for the moral value of an action. This thesis is called the independence-thesis, a position I argue against and falsify here. The paper surveys those arguments for and against the independence-thesis that are based on moral practice. The first part of the paper refutes the only argument in favour of the independence-thesis, and the second part justifies two arguments against it.