Open Access
Socrates and Thrasymachus on Perfect and Imperfect Injustice
Author(s) -
Roslyn Weiss
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
plato journal/plato
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.108
0eISSN - 2183-4105
pISSN - 2079-7567
DOI - 10.14195/2183-4105_22_6
Subject(s) - socrates , injustice , economic justice , imperfect , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy , epistemology , moderation , law and economics , law , sociology , political science , social psychology , psychology , linguistics , biochemistry , chemistry
It is argued that the true definition of justice in Plato’s Republic appears not in Book IV but in Book I, where it is clear that justice is other-oriented or external rather than internal as per Book IV. Indeed, on Book IV’s definition, there is virtually no difference between justice and moderation. Considered here is a single argument between Socrates and Thrasymachus (351b-352d), in which Socrates contends that imperfect injustice is “stronger” than perfect. Rather than producing a just group, the justice between members of a group strengthens the injustice of a group whose external project is already unjust.