Open AccessEssence Without Fundamentality
Author(s) -
Agustín Rayo
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
theoria
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.2
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 2171-679X
pISSN - 0495-4548
DOI - 10.1387/theoria.14472
Subject(s) - metaphysics , modality (human–computer interaction) , epistemology , philosophy , span (engineering) , computer science , artificial intelligence , civil engineering , engineering
In Modality and Explanatory Reasoning, Boris Kment argues that a single notion of essence can be used to play two distinct theoretical roles. He thinks there is an important connec- tion between essence and metaphysical necessity, on the one hand, and between essence and metaphysical explanation, on the other.
In this paper I will argue that it is not clear that a single notion of essence should be used to perform both these jobs. For whereas the project of giving metaphysical explanations requires a notion of essence that distinguishes between truths that are more or less “funda- mental” in a metaphysical sense, the project of shedding light on metaphysical necessity does not.