The Impact Of Academic Medical Center Policies Restricting Direct-To-Physician Marketing On Opioid Prescribing
Author(s) -
Matthew D. Eisenberg,
Elizabeth M. Stone,
Harlan R Pittell,
Emma E. McGinty
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
health affairs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.837
H-Index - 178
eISSN - 2694-233X
pISSN - 0278-2715
DOI - 10.1377/hlthaff.2019.01289
Subject(s) - pharmaceutical marketing , business , opioid , marketing , conflict of interest , medicine , opioid epidemic , family medicine , pharmaceutical industry , finance , receptor , pharmacology
Direct-to-physician opioid marketing by pharmaceutical companies is widespread and may contribute to opioid overprescribing, an important driver of the US opioid crisis. Using a difference-in-differences approach and Medicare Part D prescriber data, we examined the effects of academic medical centers' conflict-of-interest policies that restrict direct-to-physician marketing of all drugs on opioid prescribing by physicians at eighty-five centers in the period 2013-16. We examined restrictions on gifts and meals, speaking and consulting engagements, and industry representatives' access to academic medical centers, as well as rules requiring conflict-of-interest disclosures. Bans on sales representatives were associated with a 4.7 percent reduction in the total volume of opioids prescribed and disclosure requirements with a 2.5 percent reduction, while having all four marketing restriction policies was associated with an 8.8 percent reduction. Policies that restrict direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing may curb opioid prescribing, but additional patient-level research is needed to understand how such policies affect the delivery of evidence-based treatment for chronic pain.
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