Open AccessThe expected prisoner’s dilemma – With rationally arising cooperation
Author(s) -
Richard J. Arend
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
plos one
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.99
H-Index - 332
ISSN - 1932-6203
DOI - 10.1371/journal.pone.0239299
Subject(s) - prisoner's dilemma , dilemma , superrationality , mathematical economics , game theory , stochastic game , traveler's dilemma , computer science , set (abstract data type) , repeated game , normal form game , simultaneous game , path (computing) , strategy , non cooperative game , mathematics , geometry , programming language
Currently, there is no satisfying answer to how cooperation arises rationally in a single-play prisoner’s dilemma game with complete information. When player types are known, as well as payoffs and actions, economic analysis through payoff-optimizing computation does not provide a clear path for cooperation. We propose a new form of game–the ‘expected’ game–and illustrate its implications for theory and practice based on the prisoner’s dilemma example. We prove that cooperation can be a rational choice for players in reality in such games defined by a weighted set of payoffs of two or more different reference games.