Open AccessHerd immunity and a vaccination game: An experimental study
Author(s) -
Wooyoung Lim,
Pengfei Zhang
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
plos one
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.99
H-Index - 332
ISSN - 1932-6203
DOI - 10.1371/journal.pone.0232652
Subject(s) - herd immunity , vaccination , context (archaeology) , punishment (psychology) , immunity , herd , population , externality , immunology , microeconomics , economics , biology , medicine , environmental health , social psychology , immune system , psychology , veterinary medicine , paleontology
Would the affected communities voluntarily obtain herd immunity if a cure for COVID-19 was available? This paper experimentally investigates people’s vaccination choices in the context of a nonlinear public good game. A “vaccination game” is defined in which costly commitments (vaccination) are required of a fraction of the population to reach the critical level needed for herd immunity, without which defectors are punished by the natural contagion of epidemics. Our experimental implementation of a vaccination game in a controlled laboratory setting reveals that endogenous epidemic punishment is a credible threat, resulting in voluntary vaccination to obtain herd immunity, for which the orthodox principle of positive externalities fails to account. The concave nature of the infection probability plays a key role in facilitating the elimination of an epidemic.