Open AccessThe Role of Opportunistic Migration in Cyclic Games
Author(s) -
Pierre Buesser,
Marco Tomassini
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
plos one
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.99
H-Index - 332
ISSN - 1932-6203
DOI - 10.1371/journal.pone.0098190
Subject(s) - imitation , diversity (politics) , stochastic game , radius , inverse , computer science , mathematics , biology , microeconomics , economics , computer network , sociology , geometry , neuroscience , anthropology
We study cyclic evolutionary games in a spatial diluted grid environment in which agents strategically interact locally but can also opportunistically move to other positions within a given migration radius. We find that opportunistic migration can inverse the cyclic prevalence between the strategies when the frequency of random imitation is large enough compared to the payoff-driven imitation. At the transition the average size of the patterns diverges and this threatens diversity of strategies.