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Dangerous decisions: A theoretical framework for understanding how judges assess credibility in the courtroom
Author(s) -
Porter Stephen,
Brinke Leanne
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
legal and criminological psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.65
H-Index - 57
eISSN - 2044-8333
pISSN - 1355-3259
DOI - 10.1348/135532508x281520
Subject(s) - credibility , psychology , irrational number , heuristics , innocence , social psychology , trustworthiness , cognitive dissonance , adversarial system , law , computer science , political science , geometry , mathematics , psychoanalysis , operating system
Purpose. Numerous wrongful convictions have brought into question the ability of judges and juries to accurately evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including defendants. Dangerous decisions theory (DDT) offers a theoretical framework to build our understanding of the decision‐making process that can culminate in such injustices. Arguments. According to DDT, the reading of a defendant's face and emotional expressions play a major role in initiating a series of ‘dangerous’ decisions concerning his/her credibility. Specifically, potent judgments of trustworthiness occur rapidly upon seeing a defendant's face, subjectively experienced as intuition. Originally evolved to reduce the danger to the observer, the initial judgment – which may be unreliable – will be enduring and have a powerful influence on the interpretation and assimilation of incoming evidence concerning the defendant. Ensuing inferences will be irrational, but rationalized by the decision maker through his/her subjective schemas about trustworthiness and heuristics for identifying deceptive behaviour. Facilitated by a high level of motivation, a non‐critical, tunnel vision assimilation of potentially disconfirming or ambiguous target information can culminate in a mistaken evaluation of guilt or innocence. Conclusions. Empirically based education and responsible expert testimony could serve to reduce such biases and improve legal decision‐making.