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False signs and the non‐specificity of theory of mind: Evidence that preschoolers have general difficulties in understanding representations
Author(s) -
Leekam Susan.,
Perner Josef,
Healey Laura,
Sewell Claire
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
british journal of developmental psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.062
H-Index - 75
eISSN - 2044-835X
pISSN - 0261-510X
DOI - 10.1348/026151007x260154
Subject(s) - theory of mind , false belief , psychology , autism , mental representation , cognitive psychology , cognition , developmental psychology , cognitive development , neuroscience
The discovery that 3‐year‐old children have difficulties understanding false belief has fuelled two decades of research directed at understanding why children have this problem. One unresolved question is whether false belief problems are due to difficulties with mental or representational aspects of mental states. This question has implications for current arguments about the domain specificity of theory of mind in typically developing children and in populations with autism and brain damage. We revisit this question, presenting evidence that preschoolers' difficulty with false belief is not a domain‐specific problem with mental states but a more general difficulty with understanding representations.