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Regret triggers inaction inertia – but which regret and how?
Author(s) -
Sevdalis Nick,
Harvey Nigel,
Yip Michelle
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
british journal of social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.855
H-Index - 98
eISSN - 2044-8309
pISSN - 0144-6665
DOI - 10.1348/014466605x84790
Subject(s) - regret , value (mathematics) , contingent valuation , economics , psychology , valuation (finance) , social psychology , inertia , microeconomics , willingness to pay , mathematics , statistics , physics , finance , classical mechanics
When people miss a good bargain, they are less likely to take a subsequent one that is not as good. This phenomenon is termed inaction inertia . Two regret‐based explanations of it have been proposed. According to one, people anticipate that buying the item will lead to regret because it will remind them that they missed a better opportunity to buy it. According to the other, the regret people experience when missing a bargain, together with a subjective devaluation of the item resulting from that, produces inaction inertia. In two studies, we assessed experienced regret, anticipated regret, subjective valuation (SV) of the bargain and likelihood of purchase. Our findings provide grounds for reconciling the above accounts. The former is more appropriate when the difference between the previous and subsequent bargain is large, and the latter is more appropriate when it is smaller. Furthermore, our findings suggest that previous accounts of inaction inertia are incomplete. Whereas subjective value and regret considerations jointly determine purchase likelihood when no previous opportunity has been missed, regret considerations are the sole determinant of this likelihood when such an opportunity has been missed. Inaction inertia arises at least partly because considering regret turns attention away from the financial advantages of taking the bargain.