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The primacy of self‐referent information in perceptions of social consensus
Author(s) -
Clement Russell W.,
Krueger Joachim
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
british journal of social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.855
H-Index - 98
eISSN - 2044-8309
pISSN - 0144-6665
DOI - 10.1348/014466600164471
Subject(s) - referent , psychology , perception , social psychology , social perception , stimulus (psychology) , cognitive psychology , philosophy , linguistics , neuroscience
People's own responses to a social stimulus (i.e. whether they endorse it or reject it) predict how they expect other people to respond (consensus estimates). This correlation has long been accepted as evidence for social projection. There has been little direct evidence, however, for the assumption that self‐referent judgments shape judgments about others. Supporting the projection model, Expt 1 shows that self‐referent information is more accessible than consensus estimates. Once they have been made, people s own endorsements and rejections of a stimulus facilitate consensus estimates. In turn, consensus estimates facilitate endorsements (but less so). Judgments about the physical properties of the stimulus facilitate neither type of social judgment. Supporting the view that projection is egocentric, Expt 2 shows that, when making consensus estimates, people rely more on their own endorsements than on the endorsements made by another individual. This self‐other difference does not depend on whose endorsements are revealed first or on whether the other person is anonymous or individuated.